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Abstract 
Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown rapidly over the past 
decade.  The paper documents the growth of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
other financial flows between China and Latin America and identifies the interests of 
China in the region as a source of raw materials, a market for exports of manufactured 
goods and an area of diplomatic competition with Taiwan.  It points to the asymmetric 
nature of the relationship in terms of the relative importance of bilateral trade to each 
partner, the composition of trade flows, and the balance of FDI flows.  It shows that these 
show many of the characteristics of centre-periphery relations.  However China is far 
from becoming a new hegemonic power in Latin America and the latter’s relations with 
the United States and Europe continue to be more significant than those with China. 
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Latin America and China – A New Dependency?1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown rapidly over the past 
decade.  The most striking manifestation of this has been the growth of bilateral trade but 
this has been accompanied by closer diplomatic relations with Argentina, Mexico and 
Venezuela being recognised as “strategic partners” by China since 20002 and the Chinese 
government issuing its first Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008.
3
  
During the same period, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru signed free trade agreements with 
China. 
 
The growing involvement of China in Latin America has not attracted as much attention 
or controversy as its role in Africa and the academic literature, although growing, is more 
limited.  Nevertheless it has given rise to debates concerning both the economic impact of 
China on the region and the political implications in particular whether China represents 
a challenge to US hegemony in Latin America.
4
 
 
This paper will focus on three aspects of the economic relations between China and Latin 
America, namely bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows, 
particularly aid.  The paper documents the extent and growth of economic relations with 
China and asks how significant they are relative to those with the region’s other major 
partners.  Is China replacing the West as an engine of growth for the region, or is it a new 
source of dependency?   In considering these questions, the asymmetric nature of the 
economic relations between China and Latin America will be analysed. 
 
2. The Growing Economic Relations between China and Latin America 
a) Trade 
Latin American exports to China have grown spectacularly in recent years. While trade 
with China was expanding during most of the 1990s, a sharp increase in Chinese imports 
from the region occurred after 1999 (see Fig.1).
5
   A further inflection point occurs in 
2002 when the growth of Chinese imports from the region accelerated further.  Since this 
 4 
pattern holds for all the major Latin American countries exporting to China, it would 
seem that the explanation must be sought in events in China rather than developments in 
the various Latin American countries.  One explanation is that resource constraints really 
began to bite in China at the end of the 1990s.  This view is supported by the sharp 
increase in China’s net trade deficit in a number of primary commodities which feature 
prominently in Latin America’s exports such as copper, iron ore, nickel and soybeans 
from the late 1990s.
6
.  Furthermore the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 and the 
sharp rise in commodity prices from 2002 gave an additional boost to the region’s 
exports.  Despite a temporary drop in imports from Latin America in 2009 associated 
with the global financial crisis, these recovered rapidly in 2010. 
 
Figure 1 
China and Hong Kong's Imports from Latin America, 1990-2010
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Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics  
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The share of China in total Latin American exports, having been stable during the 1990s, 
increased almost seven-fold between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 1).  In 1990 only Cuba, of 
the nineteen Latin American countries listed in Table 1, had a significant share of total 
exports going to China.  By 2000, prior to China’s accession to the WTO, Chile, Peru and 
Uruguay had increased their share of exports to China to over 5% of total exports, but 
China remained a relatively minor market even for these countries. By 2009 
however China was the top export market for Brazil, Chile and Cuba and the second most 
important for Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru.   
 
Table 1: Exports to China and Hong Kong as a share of total exports, 1990, 2000, 
2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
Argentina 2.4% 3.4% 9.0% 
Bolivia 0.1% 0.4% 3.3% 
Brazil 2.1% 2.6% 16.1% 
Chile 0.8% 5.0% 25.0% 
Colombia 0.3% 0.3% 5.1% 
Costa Rica 0.5% 0.5% 8.0% 
Cuba 20.8% 5.3% 27.5% 
Dominican Republic 0.0% 0.2% 1.8% 
Ecuador 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 
El Salvador 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
Guatemala 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 
Honduras 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
Mexico 0.4% 0.2% 1.6% 
Nicaragua 0.9% 0.0% 0.3% 
Panama 0.2% 1.2% 5.6% 
Paraguay 0.3% 1.3% 0.9% 
Peru 1.7% 6.8% 18.5% 
Uruguay 4.8% 5.0% 14.0% 
Venezuela 0.2% 0.1% 7.7% 
Total  1.3% 1.3% 9.1% 
Source: Own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
However not all Latin American countries have participated equally in the boom of 
exports to China.  While China accounted for over 9% of the region’s total exports in 
2010, the shares for individual countries ranged from less than 2% of total exports in 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and several Central American 
countries, to over 15% in Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Peru (see Table 1).  One obvious reason 
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for this is that all those countries which had a low share of exports to China, apart from 
Mexico and Ecuador, still recognise Taiwan and therefore do not have diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China.  In contrast, the close political ties between 
Cuba and China and the fact that Cuba is excluded from its closest market, the USA, 
helps explain the high level of trade between the two countries. 
 
Latin American imports from China have also grown significantly in recent years.  Figure 
2 shows that Chinese exports to the region grew gradually from the early 1990s (with 
slight dips in 1996 and 1999) until 2003, after which they accelerated markedly.  This 
reflected the growing international competitiveness of China in an expanding range of 
manufactured goods and improved access to Latin American markets following China’s 
accession to the WTO in late 2001.  Exports to the region fell in 2009 as a result of the 
crisis but growth resumed in 2010. 
Figure 2 
China and Hong Kong's Exports to Latin America, 1990-2010
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China’s share in total imports to Latin America grew gradually during the 1990s but then 
increased more than five-fold between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 2).  In 1990 only Cuba 
registered significant imports from China.  Table 2 also shows the increasing share of 
imports from China in individual Latin American countries.  Although the share of China 
varies between countries, the differences are not as marked as in the case of exports.   
 
Table 2: Imports from China and Hong Kong as a share of total imports, 1990, 
2000, 2010 
 1990 2000 2010 
Argentina 0.6% 4.8% 13.6% 
Bolivia 0.7% 3.5% 3.9% 
Brazil 1.3% 2.8% 14.5% 
Chile 1.4% 5.4% 17.7% 
Colombia 0.2% 2.3% 13.6% 
Costa Rica 0.6% 1.5% 7.7% 
Cuba 9.4% 7.2% 12.0% 
Dominican Republic 1.1% 1.5% 4.7% 
Ecuador 0.0% 0.0% 8.2% 
El Salvador 0.2% 1.1% 5.9% 
Guatemala 0.5% 1.3% 8.2% 
Honduras 0.0% 0.9% 7.9% 
Mexico 1.5% 1.9% 15.2% 
Nicaragua 2.0% 0.0% 8.1% 
Panama 1.0% 1.4% 5.8% 
Paraguay 3.8% 11.4% 34.9% 
Peru 0.4% 4.3% 13.3% 
Uruguay 1.1% 4.1% 14.3% 
Venezuela 0.4% 2.0% 10.5% 
Total 19 1.4% 2.5% 14.1% 
 
Source: Own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
  
Perhaps surprisingly, given that it does not have diplomatic relations with China, the 
country where imports from China and Hong Kong accounted for the largest share of 
total imports in 2010 was Paraguay.  Most of the other major Latin American countries 
have between 10% and 20% of their imports supplied from China and China ranks either 
second or third in terms of sources of imports.  Although the Central American countries 
have below average shares of imports coming from China, they are not negligible, 
accounting for between 5% and 10% of total imports. 
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b) Foreign Direct Investment 
China launched its “Going Out” strategy to encourage Chinese companies to invest 
overseas in 2000 but until the mid-2000s the level of Chinese FDI remained relatively 
low.
7
   However since then Chinese FDI has grown rapidly and in 2010 it was the fifth 
country in the world in terms of outward investment flows.
8
   As global FDI outflows fell 
dramatically with the financial crisis, China increased its share of the total from less than 
1% in 2007 to over 4% in 2009.
9
  
 
Chinese FDI in Latin America has also grown rapidly in recent years (see Table 3), but in 
contrast to the ample evidence of the growing trade links between China and Latin 
America, the information available on FDI flows is much more limited and problematic 
in terms of quality.  The main source of data for Chinese FDI outflows is MOFCOM, the 
Chinese Trade Ministry.  It has been suggested that their figures underestimate the true 
level of Chinese FDI since not all companies register their investment with MOFCOM.  
Firms also often fail to report foreign earnings re-invested abroad which are regarded as 
FDI by international standards.  Another problem in terms of identifying the countries 
which receive Chinese FDI is that many Chinese firms make their foreign investments 
through subsidiaries in other countries, particularly the British Virgin Islands, the 
Cayman Islands and Hong Kong. Since firms often report the first and not the final 
destination of their investments to MOFCOM, 80% of Chinese FDI is recorded as going 
either to Hong Kong or to tax havens.
10
  Investments in Latin America carried out in this 
way will not therefore be registered as Chinese FDI either by MOFCOM or the host 
countries. 
 
Despite these caveats, the most striking feature of bilateral investment flows is their 
relatively modest level up to now.  If one ignores FDI flows between China and 
Caribbean tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, the role 
of FDI is not nearly as significant as that of trade in bilateral relations.   In 2010, Chinese 
FDI flows to the region were less than $1 billion (see Table 3) which compares to 
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Chinese exports of goods of more than US$175 billion in the same year (see Figure 2).  
Although this was a fifty-fold increase over the 2003 level, Latin America’s share of 
worldwide Chinese FDI was only a little over 1% of the total.  Similarly, although the 
stock of Chinese investment in Latin America increased almost ten-fold over the period 
to US$3 billion in 2010, the share of global Chinese investment was less than 1%, almost 
exactly the same as in 2003.  
 
Table 3: Chinese FDI in Latin America, 2003-2010 
 FDI Outflow FDI Stock 
 US$mn. Share of Total 
Chinese FDI 
US$mn. Share of Total 
Chinese FDI 
2003 16.6 0.58% 321.7 0.97% 
2004 46.4 0.84% 408.2 0.91% 
2005 48.8 0.40% 502.8 0.88% 
2006 90.4 0.51% 653.4 0.87% 
2007 301.8 1.14% 1040.5 0.88% 
2008 89.8 0.16% 1249.2 0.68% 
2009 356.0 0.63% 1696.0 0.69% 
2010 878.6 1.28% 3047.8 0.96% 
 
Source: MOFCOM 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Commerce, 2011. 
 
Much higher levels of Chinese FDI in Latin America have been reported by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in various reports.  The 
figures which they report vary considerably with one estimate that China invested 
US$7.3 billion in Latin America between 1990 and 2009 and another giving a much 
larger figure of $23.8 billion for the period 2003-2009 and over $15 billion in 2010.
11
  It 
is unclear how far this is based on announcements of investment which tend to 
overestimate the FDI that actually takes place, but even if they represent actual inflows of 
capital, they are still far less significant than the bilateral trade flows.. 
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FDI flows between Latin America and China have not been entirely one way and several 
Latin American firms have established operations in China.  These include the Brazilian 
aircraft manufacturer Embraer and the Mexican firms CEMEX and Bimbo.  Between 
2002 and 2009 inflows of FDI from Latin America totalled almost US$1 billion, with a 
peak of US$150 million in 2006 (Table 4).  Since then annual inflows have been more or 
less stable at around $100 million a year.  Although China has been a major destination 
for global FDI, Latin America’s share of this inflow has been negligible.  Nor is China a 
significant destination for Latin American FDI, accounting for less than 1% of the 
region’s total outflows over the same period. 
 
Table 4: Latin American FDI in China, 2002-2009 
 Value 
(US$ million) 
Share of China’s 
FDI inflows 
Share of Latin 
America’s FDI 
outflows 
2002 117.87 0.22% 1.66% 
2003 106.6 0.20% 1.13% 
2004 144.01 0.24% 0.75% 
2005 108.71 0.18% 0.56% 
2006 152.94 0.24% 0.35% 
2007 97.09 0.13% 0.42% 
2008 106.31 0.12% 0.28% 
2009 99 0.11% 0.71% 
2002-2009 932.53 0.26% 0.76% 
 
Source: own elaboration from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues and 
UNCTADStat database. 
 
c) Financial Flows 
Systematic information on other financial flows from China to Latin America is even 
more difficult to come by than data on FDI.  This in part reflects the difficulty in 
classifying different types of capital flows and the problem in the case of China in 
distinguishing between FDI, commercial loans and aid, when these are often packaged 
together. 
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Table 5: Reported Chinese Aid to Latin America, 2002-2007 (US$ million) 
 
2002 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
4 1 7,000 2,931 16,425 401 
 
Source: T. Lum, H. Fischer, J. Gomez-Granger and A. Leland, China’s Foreign Aid 
Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, R40361, 2009, Table 4. 
 
Table 5 provides one estimate of financial flows from China to Latin America.  Although 
described as “aid”, the data includes government-sponsored investment, concessional 
loans and grants.  In fact over 90% of the total flows to Latin America between 2002 and 
2007 were made up of government-sponsored investments.
12
 
 
As with trade relations and FDI, other financial flows from China have only become 
significant fairly recently.  Indeed they start at around the time of President Hu Jintao’s 
first visit to the region in 2004.  Subsequently, between 2007 and 2010, there was a sharp 
increase in loans to Latin America by the China Development Bank and the Export-
Import Bank of China and it was reported that by the end of the period these Chinese 
banks were lending more to the region than either the World Bank or the Inter-American 
Development Bank.
13
 
 
3. Latin America’s Role for China 
From the point of view of China, there are three key interests in terms of its relations with 
Latin America.
14
  First and foremost, it is an important source of the primary 
commodities that China needs to supply its rapidly growing industrial sector with energy 
and raw materials and to meet increasing demand for foodstuffs associated with rising 
income levels. Second, it is an expanding market for manufactured goods and the 
Chinese government has been keen to improve market access for the country’s exporters.  
Finally Latin America plays an important part in the diplomatic competition between the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.  Half the countries in the world that still 
recognize Taiwan are in Latin America and the Caribbean and, in terms of size, Paraguay 
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and the Central American countries are the most significant countries with which the 
latter still has diplomatic relations. 
 
a) Latin America as a source of raw materials 
The clearest evidence of the importance of Latin America as a source of raw materials for 
China is the structure of the region’s exports and the way that these have evolved over 
time.  Primary products accounted for over 70% of Latin American exports to China in 
2008 and resource-based manufactures (i.e. primary products with a limited degree of 
processing) for a further 16% (see Table 6).  The main products exported from the region 
to China were copper ore and concentrates, soybean and soya oil, iron ore, crude oil, 
refined copper and fishmeal.   
 
Table 6: Composition of Latin American Exports to China and the Rest of the 
World, 1990, 2000, 2008 (% share) 
  
 China Rest of the World 
 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 
Primary Products  40.2 58.1 71.9 49.1 27.0 38.5 
Manufactured Goods 59.8 41.8 28.1 49.7 71.3 58.5 
Resource based 25.1 23.3 15.8 22.0 17.2 15.1 
Low technology 10.1 5.8 2.4 9.6 11.9 7.7 
Medium technology 24.3 6.2 5.6 15.5 25.6 23.4 
High technology 0.2 6.5 4.3 2.6 16.7 12.3 
Other 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 1.7 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
Note: Exports from Latin America and the Caribbean to the People’s Republic of China 
 
 
Latin American exports to China are much more heavily concentrated on primary 
products and resource based manufactures than the region’s exports to the rest of the 
world, where primary products make up less than 40% of the total (Table 4).  Also the 
trend over time has been for the share of primary products in Latin American exports to 
China to increase significantly, while their share in exports to the rest of the world is 
lower than in 1990.  The increased share of primary products in exports to China has 
come partly at the expense of exports of resource based manufactures. 
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The importance of securing raw materials is also reflected in the pattern of Chinese FDI 
in Latin America.  The bulk of Chinese investment in the region is of the “resource 
seeking” variety focussing on oil and minerals.  Unfortunately there is no detailed 
breakdown of Chinese FDI by sector in Latin America, but it is clear that oil and gas and 
mining have been a major focus for such investment. The UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean estimates that 92% of confirmed Chinese investment in 
the region were in natural resource extraction, primarily oil and gas.
15
  Ten of the twelve 
major mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms in South America between 2002 and 
2008 were in raw materials, energy and power.
16
   Major Chinese companies with 
investments in Latin America include Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC in oil and gas and 
Minmetals, Chinalco and Wuhan Steel in minerals.  
 
Securing access to natural resources has also been an important factor in other forms of 
financial flows from China to Latin America too.  A report by the U.S. Congressional 
Research Service reported that over two-thirds of the projects financed by China in the 
region were in the natural resource sector, while 28% were in infrastructure and public 
works, part of which may also have been related to gaining access to raw materials.
17
 
While these figures may have included some FDI projects, other forms of funding have 
clearly played an important role in securing supplies of oil and minerals.  Some of the 
most high profile examples include loans of US$10 billion from the China Development 
Bank to Petrobras in Brazil in 2009 in return for 200,000 barrels of oil a day and to the 
Venezuelan government in 2010 for between 200,000 and 300,000 barrels a day.  An 
earlier example was an agreement signed between the Chinese company Minmetals and 
the Chilean state owned mining company CODELCO which agreed to supply copper at a 
fixed price for fifteen years in return for an investment of US$500 million in 2005.
18
  
 
b) Latin America as an export market 
Although China’s exports to the US, Europe and the rest of Asia are far more significant 
than its exports to Latin America, gaining access to the Latin American market is an 
important aspect of the relationship.  While exports to Latin America account for only 
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5% of China’s total exports they have been growing rapidly in recent years.  China is 
keen to diversify its export markets in order to reduce its dependence on the US and other 
developed country markets.
19
 Also the slowdown in growth in North America and Europe 
as a result of the financial crisis and the rapid recovery in Latin America since 2009 has 
increased the attraction of the region as an expanding market. 
 
The rapid growth of imports from China has been a cause of concern in many Latin 
American countries giving rise to complaints from local manufacturers about “unfair” 
competition from Chinese goods.  China has become a major target for anti-dumping and 
safeguard measures in several Latin American countries.  In Argentina  the government 
introduced a set of measures in 2007 aimed at restricting imports of plastic products, 
leather products, textile and footwear, metal tools, electrical machinery, tires, optical and 
clockwork instruments and toys from Asian countries, particularly China.
20
 Brazil has 
also used anti-dumping measures more extensively against China than against any other 
country.
21
  Mexico has experienced more trade conflict with China than any other Latin 
American country and until recently maintained high import duties on more than 1,300 
tariff items.
22
  
 
An important objective of Chinese diplomacy in the region has been to improve market 
access for Chinese goods.  One way in which it has tried to do this is by obtaining 
“market economy” status from Latin American governments.23  This was one of the key 
objectives of the visit of President Hu Jintao to Latin America in 2004 and Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Peru and several Caribbean countries agreed to grant China 
market economy status at the time, although the necessary legislation has never been 
approved in Brazil. 
 
Although, as discussed earlier, Chinese FDI in Latin America has been largely focussed 
on extractive industries, there has also been some Chinese investment in manufacturing 
for example in textiles and electronics in Mexico and in consumer electronics and 
telecommunications in Brazil.  Most of the Chinese FDI in manufacturing has been 
market seeking i.e. to supply the domestic market while investments to create export 
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platforms to sell in third markets has been minimal.
24
  Whereas investment in oil and 
mining is dominated by large state companies, FDI by manufacturing companies involves 
a wider range of firms in terms of ownership and size.  Surveys of small and medium 
Chinese firms have found that FDI is often seen as a means of promoting exports, either 
of the firms themselves or of other Chinese firms.
25
  
 
Some of the other financial flows from China to Latin America can also be seen as partly 
reflecting an interest in the region’s market.  This is particularly true in the case of 
government support for infrastructure projects which often requires 50% of project 
materials and services to be sourced from China.
26
   Some major Chinese firms which 
have been involved in large infrastructure projects in Latin America such as Sinohydro in 
power and Huawei in telecommunications are in fact engaged in exporting equipment to 
the region.
27
 If, as has been suggested, investment in infrastructure in China will tail off 
in the foreseeable future, then there will be more pressure on Chinese construction and 
other companies to look for new markets overseas. 
 
c) China and Taiwan 
The PRC’s “One China Policy” means that it will not maintain diplomatic relations with 
countries that recognize Taiwan and it has sought to isolate the latter internationally.  
This has been an important factor in relations between China and the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean (and Paraguay in South America) where China and Taiwan 
compete diplomatically.
28
  In the 1980s the Sandinista government in Nicaragua switched 
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC but then when they lost power in 1990, Taiwan was 
recognized once more and continues to be, despite the FSLN returning to power.  More 
recently in 2007, Costa Rica broke off its long-standing diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
and recognized the PRC. 
 
The issue of diplomatic recognition has a significant influence on trade, foreign direct 
investment and aid and other financial flows to the region.  Since 2004 Taiwan has signed 
free trade agreements with five Central American countries, Panama, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.
29
  Costa Rica on the other hand signed a free trade 
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agreement with the PRC in 2010.  As was noted earlier, countries which recognize 
Taiwan are amongst those which have not participated in the boom in the region’s 
exports to the PRC.  This was confirmed by an econometric analysis of exports from 18 
Latin American countries to the PRC for the period 1986 to 2004 which found that 
countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan tended to export less to the PRC than 
would be predicted by other variables such as Gross Domestic Product and distance.
30
  
Interestingly however, the lack of diplomatic relations was no barrier to PRC exports to 
Latin American countries that recognise Taiwan and two of the countries with the highest 
share of imports from mainland China and Hong Kong in 2010 are Paraguay and Panama 
(Table 2). 
 
In the case of Chinese FDI, the only country with diplomatic ties to Taiwan which 
receives significant flows from the PRC is Panama.  Given the role of Panama as an 
offshore financial centre and the fact that China invests heavily in other such centres in 
the Caribbean including the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, it is probable 
that investments in Panama are also largely financially motivated.  The other Central 
American economies and the Dominican Republic which receive very little FDI from the 
PRC have been targets for Taiwanese FDI. 
 
Chinese aid to the region is clearly influenced by the diplomatic competition between the 
PRC and Taiwan.  Those countries recognizing Taiwan receive substantial amounts of 
aid from Taipei.
31
  On the other hand, Costa Rica’s shift in allegiance in 2007 was 
followed by aid to build a new national stadium and for reconstruction following major 
floods, as well as a major Chinese purchase of a $300 million Costa Rican bond issue.
32
  
 
In summary then, China’s interest in Latin America as a source of raw materials, as a 
market for its manufactured exports and as an arena of competition with Taiwan largely 
explains the growth and pattern of trade, FDI and other financial flows with the countries 
of the region over the past decade.  The main drivers of these developments have come 
from the Chinese side and Latin America has been responding to agendas where China 
has been in the driving seat. 
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4. An Asymmetric Relation 
Despite the rhetoric of South-South cooperation and mutual benefit that surrounds 
relations between China and Latin America,
33
 in a number of respects the relationship is 
profoundly asymmetric.  In this section the main emphasis will be on trade flows since, 
as was noted earlier, this has up to now been the crucial dimension of economic relations 
with China. 
 
a) The significance of bilateral trade for China and Latin America 
A first asymmetry is that China is much more important as a trade partner to Latin 
America than the region is to China.   This was not always the case but has become 
increasingly so in recent years.  In 2000, although bilateral trade was still relatively 
limited, Latin America was marginally more significant to China than China was to Latin 
America with China accounting for 1.9% of Latin America’s total trade while Latin 
America accounted for 2.1% of China’s trade.  By 2010 the relative significance had been 
reversed with 11.6% of Latin American trade being with China while the region 
accounted for only 7.1% of China’s trade.34 
 
In fact given that relations are at the level of individual countries, it is more relevant to 
compare the relative significance in these terms as well.  As was noted earlier, China is 
the most important export market for three Latin American economies and second most 
important market for a further three.  In terms of sources of imports, China was amongst 
the top three suppliers for all Latin American countries apart from El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua.  In contrast, amongst Latin American countries, only Brazil (9
th
) and 
Chile (18
th
) were ranked in the top twenty suppliers of imports for China and only Brazil 
(15
th
) was in the top twenty Chinese export markets (data from ECLAC, SICGI 
database).   
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Table 7: Relative Importance of Latin America to China and China to Latin 
America in Selected Commodities, 2009 
 
 Country’s share 
of Chinese 
imports (%) 
China’s share of 
country’s 
exports (%) 
Iron ore 
Brazil 25.7 52.9 
Chile 1.1 65.4 
Peru 1.0 83.9 
Copper 
Brazil 1.4 23.6 
Chile 31.5 35.1 
Mexico 1.5 34.5 
Peru 5.6 27.9 
Oil 
Brazil 1.8 14.3 
Venezuela 2.2 4.4* 
Soybean and soy oil 
Argentina 14.8 53.5 
Brazil 37.5 53.3 
 
Source: own elaboration from UNCOMTRADE data 
 
Even at the level of the major commodities that Latin America exports, it is much more 
dependent on the Chinese market than China is on the Latin American countries as a 
source of supply.  Table 7 compares exports to China as a share of total exports for 
several Latin American countries for four major commodities, with the share of those 
countries in China’s imports of the commodities.  In the case of iron ore, only Brazil has 
a significant share of the Chinese import market with over a quarter of the total, but more 
than half of Brazilian exports go to China.  Chile and Peru which have relatively small 
 19 
shares of the Chinese market are even more dependent on China.  For copper around a 
quarter to a third of exports from the Latin American countries go to the Chinese market.  
Only in Chile is there a reciprocal dependence with China obtaining slightly less than a 
third of its imports of copper from that country.  Latin America is not a significant source 
of petroleum for China and up to now, China is not a major market for Latin American 
exports either.  Finally in soybeans and soy oil, although Argentina and Brazil are both 
significant suppliers of Chinese imports, they depend on the Chinese market for more 
than half their exports of soy which again indicates an asymmetric relation.
35
 
 
b) The Composition of Trade 
A second type of asymmetry is the structure of bilateral trade between China and Latin 
America.  As was seen above, a large and increasing proportion of the region’s exports to 
China are made up of primary products, while the bulk of non-primary product exports 
are of resource-based manufactures (Table 6).  In contrast, Chinese exports to Latin 
America are almost exclusively of manufactured goods.  
 
This trade structure cannot be explained solely in terms of the pattern of comparative 
advantage between China and Latin America.  Studies of particular value chains show 
that the Chinese government has actively promoted the development of its own 
processing industry and relied on imports to supply the basic raw materials.  A clear 
example of this is in soybeans where China developed its own crushing industry in the 
late 1990s virtually ending imports of soybean flour which were replaced by imports of 
unprocessed soybeans.
36
  A similar situation exists in relation to the copper value chain 
where Chilean exports to China are concentrated in the early stages of the value chain 
and China has invested heavily in smelting and refining capacity.
37
  Brazil’s trade with 
China in the iron and steel value chain also show a tendency towards “primarization” 
with exports increasingly being of iron ore and pig iron as opposed to steel and steel 
products.
38
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Table 8: Composition of Latin American Imports from China and the Rest of the 
World, 1990, 2000, 2008 (% share) 
 
  China  Rest of the World 
 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 
Primary Products  22.2 3.1 0.9 18.6 9.6 13.1 
Manufactured Goods 77.0 95.1 97.8 76.8 86.5 85.4 
Resource based 13.0 10.5 9.4 19.8 15.8 20.9 
Low technology 28.3 35.4 20.5 9.8 14.2 10.9 
Medium technology 23.1 25.1 26.3 34.2 35.3 36.5 
High technology 12.6 24.2 41.6 12.9 21.3 17.1 
Other 0.7 1.7 1.3 4.6 3.9 1.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
 
In terms of the type of goods imported from China, the pattern is the reverse of that noted 
for Latin American exports to China.  Virtually all Latin American imports from China in 
2008 were manufactured goods and almost 90% were non-resource based manufactures 
(see Table 8).  Contrary to some popular perceptions, imports from China are not 
predominantly of low tech goods which accounted for just over a fifth of the total by 
2008.  While over a quarter are made up of medium-technology goods, more than two-
fifths of imports from China were high technology goods.
39
  Since 2000, the share of 
high-tech imports from China has been increasing while that of low-tech products has 
tended to fall (see Table 8). 
 
The structure of trade between China and Latin America has been increasingly 
characterized by the centre-periphery type of relation with Latin America exporting 
primary products and resource based manufactures in exchange for Chinese 
manufactured goods.  Thus whereas in 1990 roughly two-thirds of Latin American 
exports to China were primary products and resource-base manufactures and two-thirds 
of imports from China were non-resource-based manufactures, by 2008, the respective 
shares had both increased to almost 90% (see Tables 6 and 8).  Moreover the types of 
manufactured goods imported from China have become increasingly technology-
intensive over time.  Thus, in contrast to the rhetoric of South-South cooperation, the 
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reality demonstrated by the trade pattern is the type of centre-periphery exchange that has 
been a concern in Latin America for more than half a century. 
 
c) Export Concentration 
Another common concern where exports are predominantly made up of primary 
commodities is the lack of diversification in terms of products exported.  This is certainly 
true in terms of the region’s exports to China where each country depends heavily on one 
or two products.  In Argentina soybeans and their derivatives account for the bulk of 
exports.
40
  In Chile around 80% of exports are of copper,
41
 while in Brazil it is soybeans 
and iron ore that dominate.
42
  The other major South American exporter to China, Peru 
relies heavily on exports of copper and fishmeal.  What is more, the trend has been for 
exports to become increasingly concentrated in a small number of products over recent 
years. 
 
Table 9: Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of Export Concentration, 2000-2009 
 China’s Exports 
to LA 
LA’s Exports to 
China 
2000 0.22 0.37 
2001 0.21 0.41 
2002 0.21 0.39 
2003 0.21 0.37 
2004 0.21 0.38 
2005 0.21 0.37 
2006 0.21 0.37 
2007 0.21 0.39 
2008 0.21 0.41 
2009 0.21 0.41 
2010 0.21 0.42 
 
Source: own elaboration from UNCTADStat database 
 
One commonly used index of export concentration is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index.  
The index is normalized so that it takes values from 0 to 1 which represents the maximum 
level of concentration.  Table 9 compares the concentration of Latin American exports to 
China with that of China’s exports to Latin America.  It is based on the 3-digit level of 
the SITC Rev.3.  The index shows that Latin America’s exports to China are much more 
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highly concentrated than China’s exports to Latin America as might be expected.  
Comparing the bilateral exports of individual Latin American countries and China would 
likely show even greater differences in terms of the level of concentration of exports from 
Latin America. 
 
Table 9 also shows that there is no tendency for Latin American exports to China to 
become more diversified.  Quite to the contrary, the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index has in 
fact increased since 2005.  This is a further asymmetry in the trade relation between 
China and the region. 
 
Not only are exports to China concentrated in terms of products, but also in terms of the 
firms involved.  For example, five firms account for over 60% of Chilean exports to 
China,
43
 while in Argentina the top ten firms make up more than 70% of exports.
44
   
Brazil’s exports to China also appear to be similarly concentrated in a handful of large 
companies.  The most extreme example in the region is probably Costa Rica where Intel 
is responsible for 85% of the country’s exports to China.  This suggests that the benefits 
from exports to China may also be highly concentrated. 
 
d) FDI and financial flows 
The asymmetry in terms of FDI flows between China and Latin America is less marked 
than in trade and less significant because of the relatively low level of FDI.  Nevertheless 
the trend could also be seen towards China increasingly taking the role of an industrial 
centre vis-à-vis a Latin American periphery.  Figure 3 shows that although flows of FDI 
from Latin America to China exceeded Chinese FDI in Latin America up to the mid-
2000s, this has been reversed in recent years and given the increase in Chinese FDI in the 
region in 2010 and projections for the future, the ratio of Chinese to Latin American 
outflows is likely to rise very significantly. 
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Figure 3: Latin American FDI flows to China vs. Chinese FDI flows to Latin 
America, 2003-2009 (US$ million) 
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Source: Chinese FDI in Latin America from MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment, various issues. 
Latin American FDI in China from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
 
The differences between flows from China to Latin America and those from Latin 
America to China that have emerged in recent years in FDI are likely to be accentuated 
by the differences in other financial flows.  While China has recently granted major loans 
to a number of Latin American governments and firms through the China Development 
Bank and the China Exim Bank, there have been no similar large loans from Latin 
America to China. 
 
5. A New Dependency on China? 
While there is strong evidence that the economic relation between Latin America and 
China has centre-periphery characteristics, it is quite another question to ask whether this 
means that China is becoming a new hegemonic power in the region.  Alternatively the 
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issue could be presented in a more positive light by considering whether China is 
becoming a new engine of growth for the Latin American economy.  From both 
standpoints the key question is how significant is China today and in the foreseeable 
future for the Latin American economies? 
 
Despite the fact that China has become the major export market for some Latin American 
countries, in aggregate just over 8% of the region’s total exports went to China in 2010, 
whereas the United States accounted for 41% and the EU for 13% of exports in the same 
year.
45
  Similarly, although the share of China in the region’s imports was rather higher at 
over 13% in 2010, this was still less than the 31% of imports that came from the US and 
the 14% from the EU. This should warn us against exaggerating the impact that trade 
with China will have on the region.   
 
Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the share of the US in both 
Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained roughly 
constant and China’s has increased significantly.  The Economic Commission for Latin 
America has projected, based on data for sixteen Latin American countries, that by 2020 
China will have overtaken the EU as both an export destination and as a source of 
imports for the region, and will have narrowed the gap with the US.
46
  In 2020 it is 
projected that China will account for almost a fifth of Latin American exports and a sixth 
of imports.   
 
In terms of FDI, China’s role in the region continues to be marginal.  Despite the 
significant recent growth of Chinese investment in the region, in 2010 China accounted 
for less than 0.3% of the total stock of foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI 
inflows in that year was only 0.8%.
47
  Even though the official figures may underestimate 
the true extent of Chinese FDI and a number of major new investments were made in 
2010, the role of Chinese firms in the region remains very limited. As they continue to 
expand globally, their presence in Latin America is likely to become more significant in 
the future.  Nevertheless Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some 
time before it achieves levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. 
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The global financial crisis provides a good test of the extent to which China has emerged 
as a key driver of economic growth in Latin America, making the region less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the US economy.  The crisis had a major impact on Latin American 
exports in 2009 with a decline in value of 23% compared to 2008.
48
  Exports to the US 
fell by 26% and to the European Union by 28%.  In stark contrast Latin American exports 
to China continued to increase in 2009, by 7.5%, reflecting the continued growth of the 
Chinese economy through the crisis (Table 10).  This has led ECLAC to claim that 
“China’s economic dynamism has come to the rescue of Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s exports”.49 
. 
How valid is this claim?  The contrast between the precipitous fall in exports to the major 
developed markets and to other Latin American countries and the continued growth of 
exports to China is indeed striking, but are these sufficient grounds to claim that China 
has rescued Latin American exports?  One question to consider is the extent to which the 
growth of exports to China between 2008 and 2009 has offset the decline in exports to 
other markets. 
 
To put this in context it should be noted that whereas total exports from Latin American 
countries to the Rest of the World (apart form China and Hong Kong) in 2009 were 
almost $200 billion down on the corresponding figure for 2008, the increase in exports to 
China in the same year was only $3.6 billion.  In other words increased exports to China 
only compensated for less than 2% of the fall in exports to other countries.   
 
Table 10 compares the change in exports to China and to the Rest of the World for 19 
Latin American countries.  This shows that although exports to China increased for the 
countries taken together, ten of them exported less to China in 2009 than in 2008, so that 
there was no offsetting effect for these countries.  Of the remaining countries, growth of 
exports to China was relatively modest (less than 5%) for three Central American 
countries.  This leaves six countries where China could be considered as having 
potentially come to the rescue of exports in the face of the global financial crisis. 
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Table 10: Impact of Exports to China on Latin American Export growth, 2008-9 
 
 Change in Exports Difference in Growth 
 To China and 
Hong Kong 
To Rest of 
the World 
No growth in 
China's 
exports 
China's 
growth = 
growth to 
ROW 
Argentina -40.1% -18.5% 0.0% -2.0% 
Bolivia -19.1% -32.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Brazil 13.4% -27.7% 1.2% 3.8% 
Chile 36.4% -28.4% 5.2% 9.2% 
Colombia 112.1% -14.3% 1.4% 1.6% 
Costa Rica 2.9% -8.9% 0.3% 1.3% 
Cuba -35.4% -24.6% 0.0% -2.9% 
Dominican 
Republic 
-15.1% -18.3% 0.0% 0.1% 
Ecuador -66.8% -24.8% 0.0% -0.9% 
El Salvador -52.9% -16.4% 0.0% -0.1% 
Guatemala -39.4% -4.3% 0.0% -0.2% 
Honduras 4.4% -20.4% 0.1% 0.3% 
Mexico 6.0% -21.4% 0.1% 0.2% 
Nicaragua -48.4% -6.3% 0.0% -0.3% 
Panama 3.5% 418.2% 0.1% -17.8% 
Paraguay -60.1% -28.3% 0.0% -0.7% 
Peru 9.1% -18.4% 1.1% 3.3% 
Uruguay 20.3% -11.9% 1.9% 3.0% 
Venezuela -4.8% -40.8% 0.0% 1.3% 
     
Total 7.5% -23.9% 0.8% 1.7% 
 
Source: own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics  
 
One way of looking at the impact of China on the region is to ask how much greater the 
drop in Latin American exports would have been between 2008 and 2009 had exports to 
China remained unchanged or alternatively how much greater would it have been if 
exports to China had matched the performance of each country’s exports to other 
markets.  Table 10 shows the difference between the actual growth of exports and these 
two counterfactuals for the region.  Column (3) shows what export growth would have 
been in each country in the absence of any increase in exports to China between 2008 and 
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2009.  In those countries where exports to China fell in 2009 then the counterfactual 
exports and actual exports are assumed to be the same.  For the region as a whole, the 
drop in total exports would have been 0.8% greater had it not been for the increase in 
exports to China.  Again this can hardly be seen as China rescuing Latin American 
exports. 
 
Looking at the figures for individual countries shows that the only country where exports 
to China made a substantial difference to overall export growth is Chile, where the 
decline in exports would have been over 5% higher in the absence of the increase in 
exports to China.  Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil and Peru would all have seen exports fall 
by between 1% and 2% more if exports to China had remained at 2008 levels. 
 
The second counter-factual considered is a scenario where exports to China fell at the 
same rate as exports to the rest of the world.    Since this would imply an overall drop in 
the level of exports to China, as opposed to the first scenario where there was no increase 
in exports, the difference compared to the actual change in exports is greater.  In 
aggregate regional exports would have fallen by 1.7 percentage points more.  Again the 
pattern for individual countries is similar with Chile being the country that benefited most 
from exports to China, followed by Brazil, Peru and Uruguay.  In none of the other 
countries was the rate of decline in exports reduced by more than 2% as a result of 
increased exports to China. 
 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that for Latin America as a whole, exports 
to China in 2009 did very little to offset the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
economy.  Even when the effects on individual countries are considered, the impacts are 
found to be quite small and it is only really in Chile where it can be argued that Chinese 
demand has played a major role in cushioning the effects of the crisis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown dramatically over the 
past decade, particularly since China joined the WTO.  Up to now this has been reflected 
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mainly in the growth of bilateral trade relations and China has become an important 
trading partner for the region.  Other aspects of bilateral economic relations still lag a 
long way behind trade in terms of their importance. 
 
The main driver of these relations has been the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy 
and its need for increased supplies of primary products.  Other important factors from the 
Chinese point of view have been obtaining access to the Latin American market for its 
exports of manufactured goods and diplomatic competition with Taiwan, particularly in 
Central America and the Caribbean.  Latin America has responded to the new 
opportunities and challenges that the Chinese boom has created.  Although relations with 
China differ between countries in the region, the overall picture is of an asymmetric 
relationship, particularly as reflected in the pattern of bilateral trade.  It has given rise to 
concerns that Latin America is returning to a dependence on primary commodities and 
that its manufacturing industries are being increasingly displaced by competition from 
Chinese imports. 
 
There is little doubt that economic relations with China will become increasingly 
important for Latin America in the future.  Trade, FDI and other financial flows are all 
likely to grow, barring a major collapse of the Chinese economic boom.  However China 
is far from becoming the dominant economic power in the region that the United States 
was in the past.  Thus one should not exaggerate either the fears or the hopes that have 
become attached to China’s growing presence in the region. 
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